theory in that social identification holds a prime position in the theoretical apparatus. SCT is mainly concerned with the combined impact of perceivers' a priori expectations regarding their social environment (the normative fit) and the characteristics of the social stimuli in the context (the comparative fit) on the way they draw distinctions between themselves and others (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Turner et al., 1987) . Depending on circumstances, the context will encourage people to appraise the social environment either in interpersonal terms, leading them to contrast themselves with other individuals, or, on the contrary, in intergroup terms, thereby triggering a so-called depersonalization process (see also Chapter 7, this volume). When people depersonalize, their self is construed in such a way that it matches the features of the other members of their group and distinguishes it from those aspects that best represent the members of the outgroup. In other words, when all is said and done, the chief idea in SCT is that people are constantly relying on comparisons to define what they are, be it as individuals or, and perhaps most importantly, as group members (Hogg, 2000) .
In the present contribution, we also emphasize the role of social comparison in the development of people's cognitions and actions, much like SCT theorists have done, but we also add the emotional dimension to the picture. We do so in the context of a research program that is concerned with the possibility that people experience emotions not as individuals but indeed as group members. As we show, our empirical work provides strong evidence for the idea that people are capable of feeling emotions not on a strict individual basis but in terms of their group membership. Importantly, because we believe that social comparison is a central aspect of people's endeavor to build an understanding of their surrounding world, our investigations led us to use social comparison as a most efficient tool in order to shape people's emotional reactions in predictable ways.
In the first section of this chapter, we provide a quick overview of the theoretical and empirical case that can be made for group-based emotions. In the second section, we offer some illustrative examples of our recent empirical work on this front. Before we conclude, our third section is devoted to a discussion of the similarities as well as some differences we see between our model of group-based emotions and research conducted under the banner of relative deprivation theory.
The case for group-based emotions
A little more than a decade ago, Smith (1993 Smith ( , 1999 questioned the then dominant perspective on prejudice and intergroup relations. Rather than adopting a view in which prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination are distinguished, much in the same way as classical attitude research uses the terms emotion, cognition, and action, Smith (1993) proposed that one would do well to refer instead to the appraisal theories of emotion (Frijda, 1986; Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure, 1989; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984 Scherer, , 1988 . These theories provide a rich set of propositions linking cognitive appraisals, emotional reactions, and behavioral tendencies. Building upon these efforts in the domain of emotions, Smith (1993) argued that it is possible to go beyond the overly simplistic expectation that people's responses are feeling negatively or positively, thinking in negative or positive terms, and acting in favor or against a target group, and account for the variety of reactions that people manifest towards social groups.
To take a simple example, the view that the members of a specific group are wealthy, intelligent, and driven, something most observers would be tempted to call a positive stereotype, is often accompanied by feelings of resentment and envy (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, and Xu, 2002) . Such a pattern is particularly tricky to explain in the unidimensional conception of traditional approaches. In contrast, the same combination poses no difficulty for appraisal theories of emotion because such descriptions of outgroup members may be accompanied by appraisals of deprivation and unjustified disparity in power and status regarding the ingroup. In sum, appraisal theories of emotion, thanks to their complex and probably more realistic description of people's reactions to events in general and social groups in particular, offer a straightforward account for patterns that are far more difficult to explain in terms of a strict continuum ranging from negative to positive. Smith (1993) did not simply encourage scholars working on prejudice to adopt appraisal theories of emotions. He also addressed the limitation stemming from the fact that appraisal theories of emotion are cast in purely individualistic terms. Strictly speaking, appraisal theories are confined to people's experiences as individuals and have little to say regarding how they may react as members of social groups. Building upon SCT (Turner et al., 1987) as well as on a series of empirical studies showing that people may indeed mentally represent closely-related others in general and the ingroup members in particular as overlapping with the self (Smith, Coats, and Walling, 1999; Smith and Henry, 1996 ; see also Cadinu and Rothbart, 1996; Otten and Wentura, 2001 ), Smith (1999) argued that observers could well experience emotions on the basis of appraisals that rest upon concerns and goals defined in social, i.e. intergroup, terms. In other words, individuals carry out a cognitive evaluation of the situation they face bearing in mind that they are group members and not just unique individuals. According to Smith, the resources and obstacles with which the group to which people belong is confronted feed the emotional experience of group members as surely as the resources and obstacles with which the individuals are confronted shape their personal emotional response.
Preliminary evidence for Smith's intergroup emotions theory comes from a series of studies by Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000) in which the authors tested their idea that the strength of the ingroup position should influence group members' emotions and action tendencies. According to most appraisal theories of emotion, anger (fear) is likely to emerge when people face a negative event, such as a conflict, and see that they do (do not) have the necessary means to stand a fight and, eventually, prevail. Anger (fear) will then translate into action tendencies aimed at confronting (avoiding) the source of conflict. The general scenario used by Mackie et al. (2000) is quite straightforward. Participants are asked to specify whether they are members of a group that supports or opposes some controversial issue. They are then asked to examine information suggesting that their opinion group enjoys substantial (versus little) collective support, whereas the other group can count on little (versus substantial) support. The key dependent measures concern group identification, emotional reactions, and action tendencies.
The first study was correlational (Mackie et al., 2000, Exp. 1) . Once participants had self-categorized into opponents or supporters of severe punishment for drug use, they were asked to indicate the level of collective support associated with the two opinion groups in presence. They then reported their level of identification with each group. Next, they stated the extent to which the group they had designated as an outgroup made them feel angry and afraid. Finally, they specified the extent to which they wanted to act against the outgroup or move away from it. The predictions are directly concerned with the impact of group resources on individual group members' reactions. To the extent that participants see their group as enjoying many (few) resources, they should experience more anger (fear) and manifest the associated action tendencies.
As predicted, the more participants believed their group enjoyed collective support, the more they felt angry and the more they wanted to challenge the other group. Moreover, anger was found to mediate the impact of perceived collective support on the tendency to confront the other group. It is noteworthy that identification with the ingroup also predicted anger and action tendencies. Furthermore, anger partially mediated the impact of identification on offensive action tendencies. In contrast to this encouraging news regarding anger, no significant results were found for fear and its associated action tendencies.
In a second study, Mackie et al. (2000, Exp. 2) manipulated collective support. To do so, they had participants read and evaluate a list of nineteen headlines supposedly taken from newspapers and related to the issue at stake, i.e., whether homosexual couples in long-term relationships should benefit from the same legal rights as married heterosexuals. Whereas the vast majority of headlines (sixteen out of nineteen) supported the ingroup in the ''strong-ingroup'' condition, only a minority of headlines (three out of nineteen) supported the ingroup in the ''weakingroup'' condition. There was also a control condition in which participants were not presented with any headlines. As would be predicted on the basis of intergroup emotions theory, participants who were made to believe that the ingroup was in a strong (weak) position felt more (less) angry and wanted to oppose the outgroup more (less). Again, anger proved to be a mediator of the impact of collective support on the tendency to confront the outgroup. Replicating earlier findings, feelings of fear and defensive action tendencies remained impervious to the manipulation.
A third study generalized these findings to yet another issue and further showed that members on both sides in relation to an issue reacted similarly to the manipulation of collective support. Rather than fear, the authors now also looked at contempt. In line with intergroup emotions theory, Mackie and colleagues found that appraisals of ingroup strength produced offensive tendencies directed against an opponent group and that anger was a mediator. However, no evidence was found for appraisal generating emotions of contempt, precluding any mediating role to emerge for this emotion in the relation between appraisal and action tendencies.
Several comments can be made about Mackie and colleagues' empirical efforts. First, at a methodological level, we think that it would be highly desirable to include a condition in which people are not members of any the opinion groups. In other words, it is not entirely clear to what extent the observed reactions truly qualify as group-based emotions, i.e., emotions that are caused and shaped by virtue of one's group membership, as we have no real point of comparison. One piece of correlational evidence indirectly supports this point, however. Identification with the ingroup has indeed been found to amplify the emotion of anger and, in turn, the resulting offensive action tendency (Mackie et al., Exp. 1) . This suggests that participants' social identity is indeed at stake. However, the fact that identification was measured only after support was considered poses a problem, and more definitive evidence on this front would be welcome.
Perhaps more strikingly, the authors selected a very specific kind of group, namely opinion groups. Members of such groups are almost by definition hostile to each other. Belonging to one group not only means that one is not a member of the other, but it is also obvious that you are opposed to the other group. The social landscape is defined in terms of two contrasting sides and good news for one group always comes as bitter information for the other group. One is thus facing a clear conflict of interests, a situation in which the level of interdependence stands extremely high. The extent to which the results can be generalized to situations in which interdependence is less negative remains unknown.
Another notable characteristic is that the emotions and action tendencies that are investigated by Mackie and colleagues all point to the outgroup as the prime target. This characteristic makes for a most interesting link with recent work in the content of stereotypes Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, and Glick, 1999) . Yet it is possible that emotions may be guided by one's group membership without the need for a specific outgroup to be the focal object of the emotional experience. Any event that takes place in which people are engaged on behalf of their group membership may be triggering emotional reactions. At the extreme, events occurring within the ingroup may also be firing group-based emotions.
More crucially, we think that there are essentially two main strategies that one can embrace to provide evidence for the existence of emotions that rest on group membership. One was adopted by Smith, Mackie and colleagues and consists in changing the objective conditions faced by the group to which people belong in the hope that this will change their subjective appraisal of the situation and directly influence their feelings and action tendencies as group members. It should be noted here that one should make sure that the checks used to ascertain the success of the manipulation are clearly distinguished from the cognitive appraisal itself. Also, the cognitive appraisals discussed in most theories of emotion concern a wide variety of dimensions, and it should be useful to examine the impact of a given situation on an extensive range of cognitive appraisals in order to substantiate the model. An exclusive focus on the issue of perceived support and coping resources may constitute too limited a set of antecedents to fully predict people's emotional reactions.
The other strategy which we implemented in our own research addresses the self-categorization side of the phenomenon. The idea here is that when people are confronted with specific events, the way perceivers appraise the situation will be crucially influenced by group membership, which provides the lenses through which the situation is being seen. It is at this level that social comparison may exert a critical impact on the unfolding of people's emotional reactions. As it happens, it is also the sort of findings that would provide the most convincing demonstration that emotional reactions and their associated behaviors are grounded in the social identity of perceivers rather than in their personal identity. As a matter of fact, by promoting a particular approach of the social landscape, one may see observers manifest very different reactions.
Our model of group-based emotions explicitly builds on the assumption made by SCT that one of several interpretations of the social world can be promoted depending on a number of contextual and individual factors (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje, 1999; Oakes, Haslam, and Turner, 1994; Turner et al., 1987) . The prediction is that observers will probably appraise an event very differently as a function of the social identity ''hat'' they are wearing. As a result of this differential appraisal, they will experience different feelings and emotions. This emotional experience, in turn, will translate into specific action tendencies and, eventually, in particular behaviors. Over recent years, we have conducted a number of studies aimed at testing our model of group-based emotions and have accumulated impressive evidence with respect to its unique predictions. As we will see in the next section, the issue of the social comparison is truly a cornerstone of our empirical work on this issue.
Evidence for our model of group-based emotions
When people are confronted with an event that concerns them directly, it is difficult to argue that they are experiencing an emotion rooted in their social identity. This is not to say that people are not reacting in terms of their group membership and that they are not showing intergroup emotions. However, it seems like a tedious enterprise to try and disentangle the personal level of reaction from the social one. A less ambiguous demonstration of the role of group membership in the emergence of emotional experience would come from a setting in which people would be presented with events that do not affect them directly. Negative events are ideal for this purpose. Indeed, people have often been shown to distance themselves from negative events confronted by others (Lerner, 1980) . Unless people are really taking seriously their common membership with the victims of hardship (Batson, 1994) and can easily restore a sense of justice, it would seem that their preferred reaction is to blame the victims.
Even more striking is the fact that people tend to use the hardship encountered by fellow ingroup members to reassure themselves that their own lot is not as bad. This phenomenon is well-known in the discrimination literature as the person-group discrimination discrepancy (PGDD) (Crosby, 1976; Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam, and Lalonde, 1990, Taylor, Wright, and Porter, 1994) : When asked about their experience of discrimination, members of a disadvantaged social group spontaneously compare themselves with other members of their ingroup so as to conclude that their own outcomes are not as bad as those of other ingroup members (Postmes, Branscombe, Spears, and Young, 1999 ; see also Chapter 10, this volume). Clearly, thus, discrimination research confirms that, unless they are strongly attached to their group, people are not quick to take the perspective of unfortunate others. Only when a clear intergroup comparison context imposes itself do people manifest group-based rather than person-based reactions.
The above rationale guided our empirical efforts. To ensure that we triggered group-based emotions and not simply personal emotions, we informed participants about harmful events involving protagonists, some of whom could be seen as ingroup or as outgroup members depending on the way participants thought of themselves. That is, in order to influence the bonding with the people affected by the events, we constrained the way participants approached the social landscape by having them endorse one or another of their social identities. In concrete terms, we did so by telling participants that we would compare their reactions as a member of a specific ingroup to the reactions of the members of other specific groups. The careful selection of the comparison context induced participants to include the victims of the harmful events in the same group as the one they themselves belonged to or, instead, encouraged them to see the victims as members of an outgroup.
It should be noted that the instructions we used never required our participants to provide us with comparative judgments. In other words, we never asked them to compare how they reacted and how they thought the target of the social comparison reacted. We never enquired about whether they thought they were better or worse off than some comparison group. We also avoided asking them to indicate how satisfied or happy they were with what was happening relative to some other group. Simply, by mentioning that we, as experimenters, were envisioning a study that would collect their responses as well as those of the members of a comparison group, we hoped to confine our participants into a particular social identity.
If participants' reactions prove impervious to our manipulation, then it is likely that we are facing person-based reactions. Alternatively, it could also be that a single social identity takes over in all conditions. In both cases, the outcome would be that no difference emerges as a function of the particular social comparison set forth in the instructions. If, on the contrary, the emotional reactions of our participants vary in a lawful manner as a function of the group membership we promoted by way of our social comparison manipulation, then we are in a good position to argue for the presence of group-based emotions. Specifically, we hoped the same emotional reactions would develop among our participants as the ones one would expect to see among the victims of the harmful events only to the extent that the social comparison manipulation induced participants to perceive the victims as fellow ingroup members. Quite a different picture should emerge when the social comparison setting encourages participants to see themselves and the victims as belonging to different groups. This simple yet powerful idea formed the basis of our initial series of studies (Gordijn, Wigboldus, and Yzerbyt, 2001; Gordijn, Wigboldus, Yzerbyt, and Hermsen, 1999 ; for a review, see Yzerbyt, Dumont, Gordijn, and Wigboldus, 2002) .
Initial test of the model
In one illustrative study (Gordijn, Wigboldus, and Yzerbyt, 2001 ), we confronted participants, students from the University of Amsterdam, with a newspaper article. The story depicted a conflict involving students from Leiden University and the professors and Board at that same university. The latter wanted to implement a series of new policies that would greatly restrict access to the university. Students had not been consulted and strongly opposed the decisions. Mobilization was on its way. Because participants were enrolled at the University of Amsterdam, they could receive the story in a number of ways, namely as students, as people enrolled in Amsterdam, or even as individual observers. We thus decided to channel the way participants approached this conflict by warning them that we were interested in comparing the reactions either of people belonging to different universities or the reactions of students and professors. It is important to note that our social comparison manipulation took place before participants' confrontation with the specific story.
The predictions were straightforward. To the extent that participants see themselves as belonging to the same group as the students of Leiden, a reaction that we hoped would be triggered in the condition comparing ''students versus professors'', they should adopt a perspective similar to the one found among the Leiden students and feel the emotions presumably experienced by these students. In contrast, we expected participants in the condition comparing ''different universities'' to see themselves and the Leiden students as belonging to different groups. As a consequence, the emotions felt by our participants would be less akin to those presumably experienced by the victims. We also included a control condition in which we did not mention any other rationale for the study than our interest in participants' reactions to the story.
Turning to the dependent variables, participants were asked the extent to which they felt angry (i.e., angry, outraged, and aggressive), happy (i.e., happy, elated, and cheerful), and anxious (i.e., anxious, powerless, and helpless). As a means to check for the manipulation, participants also indicated to what extent they felt similar to students of Leiden University, and to what extent students of Leiden University and students of the University of Amsterdam are similar (averaged to create a similarity index). The predicted interaction between emotion and condition which came out was significant. Participants reported feeling more angry and less happy when they understood that the study aimed at comparing reactions of students to those of professors compared to what was observed in the two other conditions. Interestingly, and showing the discriminant validity of the emotion indices, we found no impact of our manipulation on anxiety, another negative emotion.
It is also interesting to examine the data from the control condition somewhat more closely. As it turns out, participants confronted with a negative event harming a group of people spontaneously tended to distance themselves. Of course, we have no data allowing us to know precisely how these control participants defined the social landscape but it is possible to venture at least one interpretation based on the similarity index. Even though control participants had quite a few reasons to embrace the student identity, they seem to have preferred making a distinction between themselves and the victims. Indeed, the similarity index reveals that control participants did not differ from the participants who were told that the study compared different universities. Both conditions led to lower anger and lower similarity ratings between the Leiden students and the Amsterdam students than the condition in which participants thought the study compared the reactions of students and professors. If anything, control participants felt more different from the victims than participants in any other condition. This pattern is highly reminiscent of the PGDD in that people confronted with victims potentially associated to themselves contrasted away from them.
The above study illustrates the potential impact of selecting one social comparison target rather than another. By encouraging observers to draw particular contours in their social landscape, our manipulation generated divergent patterns of emotional reactions. After this initial success, we went on to conduct several studies in order to address a number of important additional issues. Our first question was whether we could extend our argument about the impact of the comparison context to include the issue of action tendencies. Indeed, group-based emotion theory holds that people's emotional reactions should mediate the impact of our social comparison manipulation on action tendencies. A second important issue concerns the role of identification. Although we observed that the temporary salience of one identity over another affects the chain of reactions, we wanted evidence that the impact of the contextually salient category would be moderated by the degree of identification with the salient category. Such a pattern would further establish the impact of group membership on emotional reactions and, therefore, the social nature of emotions. A third question is whether we could find cases in which an emotion other than anger, such as fear, would show the predicted pattern. Fourth, a convincing demonstration of the influence of social as opposed to personal identity on cognitive appraisals, emotions, and action tendencies would be provided if one could encourage observers to embrace the perspective of the victims as well as the perspective of the perpetrators depending on the specific comparison context. Finally, although our social comparison manipulation influences the general profile of people's emotional reactions, it would be most compelling to show that people's consensus in emotional reactions is indeed higher when participants are thrown in the same group as the victims than when they approach the situation as individual observers or as members of some less relevant group.
Action tendencies and identification
In order to simultaneously address the mediating role of emotions on action tendencies and the moderating role of identification, we conducted a study in which French-speaking students at the University of Louvain in Louvain-laNeuve, Belgium, learned about a conflict opposing Dutch-speaking students of the University of Ghent to their university authorities. The alleged clash revolved around the unexpected decision to impose English as the language for all Masters-level classes. As before, we relied on social comparison as a means to infuse a different social categorization in our participants before they were confronted with the critical event. Also before we presented them with the newspaper article, we measured participants' level of chronic identification with the group they were associated with in their specific condition, namely students in general (as compared to professors) or students from Louvain-la-Neuve (as compared to students from other universities).
Once they had read about the event, participants completed a series of scales pertaining to their emotional reactions (anger, sadness, fear, and happiness). As a specific goal of this study, we also measured their action tendencies. Three of the action tendencies were meant to concern offensive tendencies (''to intervene,'' ''to get angry,'' ''to set oneself against''), three were related to an absence of any reaction and crying (''to do nothing,'' ''to lock oneself at home,'' ''to cry''), three had to do with avoidance tendencies (''to hear no more about it,'' ''to stop thinking about it,'' ''to be reassured''), and three were associated with making fun about the event (''to make fun of it,'' ''to mock it,'' ''to be exuberant about it''). These four sets of action tendencies were selected so as to be closely related to anger, sadness, fear, and happiness, respectively.
As expected, people's emotional reactions were not only highest on anger than on any other emotion, but anger was also the only emotion that proved sensitive to our independent variables. Moreover, and in line with predictions, the pattern of reactions showed that the simultaneous presence of high identification and a group membership stressing the similarity with the victims was conducive to higher levels of anger than any of the three other combinations. In other words, when participants either were led to think of themselves as members of a different category from the victims or felt weakly identified with the category that comprised them and the victims, they reported significantly lower levels of anger.
Turning to action tendencies, initial analyses revealed the presence of three conative syndromes, namely attack, avoidance, and mockery. Clearly, offensive tendencies dominated participants' reactions, followed by avoidance and mockery. The specific categorization imposed on participants through the comparison context combined with their chronic identification lead to the production of a pattern of action tendencies that was entirely consistent with expectations. That is, participants manifested the strongest offensive action tendencies when they had been thrown in the same category as the victims and had initially expressed strong levels of identification with this category. The three other combinations did not differ from each other.
The most important objective of this study was to verify the viability of our mediational hypothesis. The idea here is that contextual categorization and chronic identification join forces in shaping participants' action tendencies via their impact on emotional reactions. In line with the recommendations spelled out by Judd and Kenny (1981) and Baron and Kenny (1986) , we implemented a model in which participants, cornered into thinking of themselves as belonging to the same category as the victims (i.e., students in general) and who had expressed a high level of identification with this category, were contrasted with all other participants. This variable was not only shown to predict offensive action tendencies but its impact was significantly reduced and turned out to be non-significant when participants' emotional reactions of anger were taken into account in the model. It is important to note that we found no support for an alternative model, in which offensive action tendencies were used as a mediator for the impact of our independent variables on anger.
In sum, this study provides very strong evidence in favor of our groupbased model. We were able to replicate our finding that contextual forces may indeed press people to endorse a particular identity in such a way that their emotional reactions to events are strongly influenced. In line with SCT's proposal that identification would combine with contextual forces to shape people's affective and behavioral reactions, we also extended previous work by showing the role of participants' chronic identification with the category in the emergence of emotional reactions. Finally, we collected firm evidence for the mediational role of emotions. As we expected, adopting a particular social identity does impact on action tendencies through an impact on the emotional experience.
It is also noteworthy that the specific comparison manipulation used here relied on sub-categorization rather than cross-categorization. We either put participants in the shoes of students in general or in the shoes of a subset of students, namely students from their university. In line with other work showing the impact of group boundaries on social behavior and intergroup relations (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000) , our findings show the importance of making salient a common ingroup in that people reacted much like the victims when it was made clear to them that they shared the same group membership as these victims.
Fear and behaviors
One feature of the above empirical demonstrations is that they all focussed on anger as the key emotional reaction. Moreover, we concentrated on emotions and action tendencies but did not provide any evidence for the impact of our manipulation of comparison context on actual behaviors. We addressed these two issues in a series of studies that took advantage of the infamous terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 .
One of these studies (Dumont et al., Expt. 2) was conducted one week after the events and presented participants with a full-page picture of the Twin Towers burning down in order to remind participants about the event. At this stage, participants were confronted with one of two rationales for the study. Whereas in one condition they were informed that the study concerned a comparison between European and Arab respondents, those in the other condition learned that their responses as Europeans would be compared with those of American respondents. The specific social comparison was thus quite subtle in that the first implicitly defined Europeans and Americans as belonging to the same group of non-Arabs. In contrast, the second comparison made explicit the distinction between Europeans and Americans. One should add that identification with Europeans that was measured before the presentation of the picture reminding the event was not affected by the manipulation. In addition to a set of questions aimed at tapping participants' emotional reactions and action tendencies, we also measured a series of behaviors that all involved communicating personal information in order to be contacted later on by other people than the experimenters themselves.
Our predictions were that all negative emotions would be very strong, reflecting the immensely tragic nature of the attacks. However, because of the specific appraisals associated with each of the emotions (Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure, 1989) , we hypothesized that our participants would show some sensitivity to our manipulation, particularly with respect to fear. Specifically, we expected appraisals of sadness and anger to be impervious to the identity manipulation. In the context of September 11th, the fact that neither Europeans nor Americans could have foreseen such a tragic succession of events, along with the certainty that many people had died and suffered because of the attacks and the common belief that little if anything could be done to ever repair the damage, all are elements that should have given rise to sadness amongst both Europeans and Americans. Also, both Europeans and Americans certainly thought that military action against the various countries hosting the terrorists was a possible line of action and that the United States would be reacting to such an attack. These appraisals should have elicited anger among both Europeans and Americans. At the same time, the critical appraisals associated with fear, that is, the uncertainty attached to one's personal future and to the availability of the required coping resources to face other events of a similar nature, should be more likely to vary as a function of whether the ingroup or an outgroup is considered to be the target of the terrorist attacks.
Results confirmed that sadness and anger indeed qualified as relevant emotions as they were strongly reported by participants. These emotions, however, proved to be unaffected by the comparison context. In contrast, and in line with predictions, making salient a comparison context linking participants with victims of the harmful behavior in a common ingroup led them to report more fear than when the comparison context had them categorize the victims as outgroup members. Moreover, we found strong evidence that the comparison context influenced behavioral tendencies. Informing participants that their answers would be compared to Arab respondents elicited stronger tendencies to seek information about the events and its developments, stronger tendencies to provide support and help to the victims, and stronger tendencies to talk about the events with other persons than when they thought they would be compared to American respondents.
Finally, whether the behaviors concerned communicating personal data so as to later receive information about terrorist networks, about how to support and help the victims, or about demonstrating for NATO's intervention, all proved sensitive to our manipulation. These behaviors would indeed be most relevant if one wished to reduce one's level of uncertainty, regain some subjective control over the situation, and improve self-protection. In fact, as much as 18 percent of participants led to categorize the victims in their ingroup, compared to a mere 3 percent in the other condition, communicated their e-mail address or telephone number in order to receive additional information about a demonstration for NATO's intervention.
To sum up, we were able to find evidence for the fact that other emotions than anger prove sensitive to the categorization and identity changes triggered by the manipulation of the comparison context. An important point is that we also demonstrated that the impact of the comparison context extends to behavioral intentions and actual meaningful behaviors.
Victims or perpetrators
To further stress the role of social categorization in the emergence of emotions, we wanted to show that the same observers could feel angry or content about a particular event as a function of the particular ''social'' shoes they were led to walk in. Of course, we also intended to show that our social comparison manipulation would trigger lawful differences in people's appraisal of the very same situation as well as in their behavioral intentions.
Addressing this question allows us to establish a direct link with fascinating research conducted over recent years on the topic of collective guilt. Indeed, a number of authors have started to examine more closely those conditions under which groups and group members may experience guilt and shame with respect to harmful behavior perpetrated by ingroup members on members of other groups. Perhaps the most telling studies in this respect were conducted by Doosje and his colleagues (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead, 1998) . In one of these (Doosje et al., 1998, Expt. 2), Dutch participants first completed an identification questionnaire pertaining to their identity as Dutch people. They were then confronted with one of three sets of information about the conduct of Dutch people in one of their former colonies. Depending on conditions, the information was either consistently negative, both negative and positive, or consistently positive. The dependent measures enquired about the extent to which participants felt guilty about the behavior of their fellow citizens and thought that compensation was in order. For obvious reasons, none of the participants could have any direct implication in the historical events that were presented.
Results indicated that participants in the negative conduct condition indeed felt guilty and very much wanted to compensate for their ancestors' misbehavior. The reverse pattern emerged in the positive conduct condition. The most interesting data concern the ambiguous condition. When behaviors posed by the Dutch colonial forces proved to be both positive and negative, only those participants who were not strongly identified expressed guilt and agreed to compensate. In contrast, high identifiers expressed significantly less guilt and were not ready to offer compensation for how their ancestors acted. These findings suggest that identification very much orients people's interpretation of events, even distant ones, thereby shaping their emotional reactions and willingness to engage in specific actions.
In one of our recent studies (Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Dumont, and Wigboldus, in press), our ambition was to show that the very same people could be manipulated into reacting either like victims or perpetrators. This should be possible simply by taking advantage of the existence of social identities linking people to either one of these two kinds of protagonists. Again, we counted on our social comparison manipulation to bring people to think differently about themselves and took advantage of the particular situation with which US universities are confronted, whereby out-of-state students pay more than their in-state colleagues to attend classes. Because it was notorious at the time of the study that most US states faced huge deficits, we informed in-state students from the University of Colorado at Boulder that their State House Representatives had decided to raise the tuition by 35 percent for out-of-state students. This information was conveyed right after we had indicated to our participants that we wanted their opinion and reactions on a series of newspaper articles either as students (in order to compare them with non-students) or as Colorado residents (in order to compare them with people from other states) and had asked them to complete a scale tapping their identification with the relevant category. We then measured participants' appraisals of the policy adopted by Colorado State House Representatives as well as their emotional reactions and action tendencies. Note here that we had never directly examined appraisals in our prior work. We were therefore very curious regarding the perception of legitimacy and justice associated with the policy as a function of the particular social identity we imposed on participants.
To make a long story short, we obtained the predicted significant interaction between identification and the contextually salient identity for all our key dependent variables. So, replicating previous findings, participants thinking of themselves as connected to the victims through the salient identity (students) tended to report more anger when they had initially indicated that they were strongly rather than weakly identified with the category of students. A mirror pattern emerged for participants in the condition where their identity associated them to the perpetrators (Colorado residents). The more these participants identified with their state, the less angry they tended to feel about the policy adopted by their State House Representatives.
In addition to the ubiquitous presence of our omnibus interaction, some nuances are worth mentioning as far as appraisals and action tendencies are concerned. Indeed, our data revealed the presence of two main kinds of legitimacy appraisals, namely how acceptable and how wrong the situation was perceived to be. Decomposing the interaction pattern into simple effects of identification for each condition revealed slightly different patterns for these two appraisals. First, participants induced to think of themselves as linked to the victims saw the decision as less acceptable as a function of their identification with the group of victims whereas identification to the group of perpetrators failed to show a significant impact. Second, participants led to see themselves as linked to the perpetrators saw the situation as less wrong as a function of their identification with the perpetrators but identification with victims had no impact on this appraisal.
A parallel comment holds for action tendencies. Here, it was possible to distinguish two action tendencies, namely take action against proposal and express support for proposal. When similarities to the victims were made salient, higher levels of identification were related to stronger willingness to take action against the proposal but the reverse was not true when similarities to the perpetrators were made salient. Rather, in that condition, higher identification was associated with expressing more support for the proposal but identification to the victims failed to induce less support for the proposal.
Globally, one can thus say that when observers were thrown in the group of the victims, identification went hand in hand with finding the situation less acceptable, feeling angry, and intending to take action against the proposal. When participants were cornered into the category of the perpetrators, higher identification made them see the situation as less wrong, feel less angry, and intend to express support for the proposal. Finally, a most compelling piece of evidence regarding the viability of our model of group-based emotions comes from our mediational analyses. As a matter of fact, we found strong evidence that the interactive impact of categorization and identification on participants' action tendencies was mediated by how illegitimate they perceived the situation, which was itself mediated by how angry they felt.
Our present efforts provide very substantial support for the validity of our model of group-based emotions. They nicely complement the findings reported by Doosje and colleagues (1998) in showing that people can be manipulated into approaching a situation from very different perspectives. Depending on the specific social landscape that was activated in their particular case, observers understood the same events, reacted emotionally to them, and intended to do something about them in ways that varied dramatically. Moreover, building upon our argument regarding the impact of categorization on intergroup emotions (Yzerbyt et al., 2002) , Wohl and Branscombe (2004) recently conducted an internet study in which Jewish participants assigned more or less collective guilt for the Holocaust to Germans, expressed more or less willingness to forgive Germans, and judged genocide as being more or less pervasive as a function of the specific identities that were activated at the outset of the questionnaire, either Jews (versus Germans) or human beings. Again, the message here is that there is definitely more than one identity that observers can embrace when they approach a situation. Our efforts and now other people's work show that, rather than leaving it all up to the observers, one can channel the social identity they adopt so as to orient their subsequent appraisals, emotions, action tendencies, and indeed behaviors.
Emotions and consensus
Our next question concerns another criterion that is generally associated with social reactions namely consensus (Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, and Turner, 1999; Haslam, Oakes, Turner, McGarty, and Reynolds, 1998; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, Reynolds, Eggins, Nolan, and Tweedie, 1998; Leyens, Yzerbyt, and Schadron, 1994) . Indeed, our model of groupbased emotions would predict that observers of an event react more like one of the protagonists to the extent that they endorse the same social identity. This prediction can be tested at the level of the emotional profile, i.e., the intensity with which people report the various emotions. A fascinating issue, however, is whether the similarity with the protagonists is also conducive to a more homogeneous reaction among observers. For instance, is it the case that people thrown in the same social category as victims of harmful events experience more consensually the same emotional syndrome, and possibly the one that the victims themselves would experience, than if they are left to approach the event as individuals or as members of an irrelevant category?
To investigate this issue, we adapted an earlier paradigm that involved the presentation of a newspaper article concerning a conflict about the adoption of English as the standard language in the students' curriculum. For the present purpose, we will focus on the most relevant issues of this research (Mathieu, Yzerbyt, and Dumont, 2005 , Expt. 1). Our participants, all French-speaking students from the University of Louvain at Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, learned that students in Flanders, the Dutch-speaking part of the country, were opposing a decision by their regional government that English would be the sole language used at Masters' level. The text expressed in striking terms the shock experienced by the Dutch-speaking students and the level of opposition that grew among them. Before being exposed to the text, however, participants were informed that we were interested in comparing the reactions either of students versus professors (making salient a relevant identity with respect to the victims) or of French-speaking versus Dutch-speaking people (highlighting an irrelevant identity with respect to the victims) regarding various events that had come out in recent news. We also added a control condition in which participants were told that our interest simply focussed on people in general (personal identity). As for the dependent variables, participants in the two experimental conditions were asked to complete an identification scale with respect to the social identity that was salient in the condition, i.e. either as a student or as a French-speaking person. We then asked all participants the extent to which they felt a series of emotions reflecting anger, happiness, and sadness.
We first examined the mean responses to these three emotions in the different conditions. On average, participants experienced more anger than sadness and more sadness than happiness. More interestingly, and in line with earlier findings, both anger and sadness were significantly higher in the relevant identity condition than in the irrelevant identity condition, the personal identity condition falling in between. Neither of these differences between experimental conditions were moderated by identification. Turning to happiness, no significant difference emerged between conditions. However, whereas identification had no influence on happiness in the irrelevant identity condition, a different story emerged in the relevant identity condition: the more participants identified with the relevant identity (students) the less they reported feeling happy. This is exactly what one would expect on the basis of our model of group-based emotions. People are not very happy in general about hearing this story, but they are even less happy when they had indicated that the student identity meant a lot to them.
Our key goal in this study concerned consensus. Our prediction was that higher levels of consensus would be observed in participants' emotional reactions when they were led to see themselves as members of a category that is relevant for the situation, namely the student category. In order to test this hypothesis, we centered our participants' scores for anger, sadness, and happiness in each condition separately and squared the resulting differences from the mean so as to obtain squared distance scores (d_: see Cadinu and Rothbart, 1996) . We then submitted these squared distance scores to a standard analysis of variance. As expected, the data for anger revealed that the distances were smaller for participants in the relevant identity condition than those in the two other conditions, which did not differ from each other. No significant effect emerged for sadness. With respect to happiness, the consensus tended to be less marked in the relevant identity condition than in the two other conditions. Although this may seem somewhat unexpected, happiness was also the only emotion for which identification also turned out to be a moderator. As one would hope, whereas no impact of identification was found in the irrelevant identity condition, the similarity of participants' answers in the relevant identity condition was stronger as a function of identification.
Taken together, these data are extremely compelling indeed. First of all, they are consistent with our earlier findings pertaining to people's average profile of reactions to events. Furthermore, they also confirm the suspicion we had regarding the social consensus that should be observed when people react with some relevant social category in mind. These data are very much in line with other efforts aimed at showing that intergroup contexts and, especially, identities that prove relevant for the topic at hand, increase the consensus in people's reactions (Haslam et al., 1999) . The originality of the present demonstration resides in the fact that consensus is shown at the level of emotional reactions rather than in terms of cognitive productions.
Summary
The ambition of the present section was to provide an overview of our research program on group-based emotions. As the description of the studies reveals, social comparison is a crucial ingredient of our experimental strategy aimed at demonstrating the impact of social identity on people's emotions. Clearly, there is a wealth of evidence showing that social comparison is indeed a key element in the emergence of emotions that are based on group membership. In light of the role our research program gives to social comparison, our efforts complement many pieces of research conducted in the framework of the relative deprivation theory. In the next section, we examine the many similarities as well as some differences between our model of group-based emotions and relative deprivation theory.
Group-based emotions and relative deprivation
A central notion underlying relative deprivation theory (Pettigrew, 1967; Runciman, 1966) is that people's actions towards social change originate in their evaluation that the situation that they are facing is not what it should be, compared to some referent. More precisely, egoistical or personal relative deprivation derives from discontent about one's personal situation compared to other individuals'. In contrast, fraternal or group relative deprivation arises when people consider that the relative standing of their group, compared to other groups, is undeserved (Ellemers, 2002; Guimond and Tougas, 1999; Kawakami and Dion, 1993, 1995; Walker and Pettigrew, 1984) . By comparing their group with one or several other groups, people, especially those who belong to disadvantaged groups, are likely to assess the relative standing of their group as being unfair and illegitimate. As a result, they may experience a sense of deprivation and feelings of displeasure likely to elicit a desire for social change. Importantly, relative deprivation theory suggests that people's involvement in social change does not have to be related to their objective standing but, rather, to their subjective sense of deprivation compared to others.
Clearly, the mechanisms postulated by relative deprivation theory entail striking similarities with our group-based emotion model (Bernstein and Crosby, 1980; Cook, Crosby, and Hennigan, 1977; De La Rey and Raju, 1996; Grant and Brown, 1995; Guimond and Dubé-Simard, 1983; Olson and Hafer, 1996; Tougas, Dube, and Veilleux, 1987) . Indeed, both lines of work would argue that a number of factors lead social observers to stick to an individual perspective on events or, instead, to embrace a social identity. Both hold that observers' appraisal of the situation need not be constrained by objective reality. Both suggest that this subjective appraisal is a crucial determinant of observers' feelings. Finally, both approaches put forth the idea that these feelings feed into action tendencies and behaviors. In sum, the evidence accumulated in our research program usefully adds to the impressive amount of data collected by relative deprivation theorists. Together, these contributions provide solid evidence for the idea that group-based emotions are an important facet of social life and, as such, account for intergroup attitudes and behavior (see for example Dambrun and Guimond, 2001; Dion, 1986; Dubé and Guimond, 1986; Grant and Brown, 1995; Guimond, 2003; Guimond and Dambrun, 2002; Guimond and Tougas, 1999; Kawakami and Dion, 1995; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, and Mielke, 1999; Olson and Hafer, 1996; Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995; Tougas and Beaton, 2002; Vanneman and Pettigrew, 1972; Wright and Tropp, 2002) .
Having stressed the similarities between these two lines of work, it is also interesting to examine for a moment a series of useful nuances and distinctions. One issue concerns the status afforded to social comparison.
In one study that nicely illustrates relative deprivation research, Tropp and Wright (1999) looked at deprivation feelings among Latinos and African Americans. Participants were not only led to think of themselves as individuals in relation to other members of their minority group or in relation to members of other disadvantaged groups, or to think of their minority group in relation to other minorities, but they were also asked to compare themselves to members of the dominant group, i.e., whites, and to compare their minority group to the dominant group of whites. The rationale for the comparisons involving whites, and especially the group-level comparison, rests on a simple idea. In order for collective action to be undertaken, Tropp and Wright (1999) argue, people may not only need to perceive their group as being relatively disadvantaged but the target of comparison must also be understood to have had some agency in creating and maintaining the group status hierarchy. In line with the authors' predictions, a comparison with the dominant group led to the accentuation of deprivation reports.
In addition to looking at participants' identification with their minority group and their experience of personal and group relative deprivation in comparison to other minorities and to the dominant group of whites, the authors also distinguished the cognitive and the affective level of reaction (Guimond and Dubé-Simard, 1983; Kawakami and Dion, 1995) . These responses were then used to predict participants' support for collective action. Only the identification measure and the affective measure of group relative deprivation in comparison to whites emerged as significant predictors of support for collective action. Interestingly, dropping these two predictors revealed the significant impact of the cognitive measure of group relative deprivation in comparison to whites.
A key message of the above research is that only the group comparison in which the dominant group, i.e., whites, was directly mentioned seemed to hold the active component. As it happens, these findings corroborate the results of a meta-analysis on relative deprivation studies conducted by Smith and Ortiz (2002) . They found impressive evidence that collective behavior and attitudes were most strongly related to participants' responses when the question involved an explicit ingroup-outgroup comparison. One should expect people to make different appraisals of deprivation and, as a result, to experience different emotions and adopt different lines of action when they approach an issue from the perspective of one social identity rather than another. The fact that Tropp and Wright (1999) obtained different responses for appraisals and feelings of relative deprivation as a result of varying the definition of the comparison outgroup, either other minorities or whites, is of course reminiscent of our own results which showed that the way respondents defined their ingroup changed subtly, albeit significantly, as a result of the referent group used in the comparison.
Although a change in the comparison group along with the associated modification of the definition of people's ingroup is by no means trivial in its consequences, most of the work we presented in this chapter adopts an even more radical perspective. Indeed, our model is unique in that it combines, on the one hand, the lessons learned from the research on the role of identification, where the spontaneous interpretation of the setting in individual and social terms can be seen to vary as a function of people's level of identification, and on the other hand, the work on the contextual salience of categorization, in which the comparison context is used to make a particular group identity salient. We would therefore argue that relative deprivation research, in spite of its merits, fails to fully take into consideration the flexibility people can manifest in the endorsement of social identities (Oakes, Haslam and Turner, 1994; Turner et al., 1987) . Instead of confronting people with several comparisons simultaneously, as was done by Tropp and Wright (1999) and, for that matter, in most studies on person-group discrimination discrepancy (see Dumont et al., this volume), we corner participants into only one of their many social identities at a time. Because people are capable of witnessing social events and social situations while wearing a variety of different hats, they may end up appraising their environment in radically different ways. As a result, they may or may not experience feelings of deprivation. In short, we argue that it is possible to change people's assessment of relative deprivation and the associated emotional experience by channeling the social identity used to approach the event.
In our opinion, these specific implications of our work on group-based emotions for relative deprivation theory are in fact quite new. The only study that explicitly links intergroup emotions to relative deprivation was reported in a chapter by Smith and Ho (2002) . Caucasian Americans were asked to indicate their attitudes and feelings with respect to Asian Americans. Smith and Ho (2002) rightly point out that Asian Americans come across as an intriguing and indeed unexpected prejudiced group. By usual standards, most stereotypes about Asian Americans would be considered as being quite positive. Nevertheless, respondents' emotional reactions seemed to boil down to resentment, envy, and anger rather than respect, admiration, and friendliness. One indication from the study by Smith and Ho (2002) is that their respondents were all the less likely to report anger or resentment if they also seemed to consider Asian Americans as belonging to the same group of Americans as Caucasian Americans. In other words, seeing the two groups as belonging to a common ingroup would seem to be the best antidote against prejudice.
We would argue that our approach, in which social comparison is explicitly relied upon to shape the social landscape, is definitely the way to go in order to draw causal conclusions regarding this conjecture. Clearly, the set of studies we presented in the previous section all testify to the power of social comparison to alter people's appraisals, emotions, and behaviors.
In our model, we insist on the role of chronic identification. This factor has also been singled out by relative deprivation theorists (Guimond and Dubé-Simard, 1983; Smith and Leach, 2004; Tropp and Wright, 1999) as a key triggering factor for people to engage in collective action (Branscombe and Ellemers, 1998; Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje, 1997; Simon, 1998; Simon and Klandermans, 2001; Wright and Tropp, 2002) . We would argue that this is the case because high identifiers more than low identifiers read the situation in group terms and, as a result, are more inclined to experience group-based emotions. Indeed, some evidence suggests that, compared to low identifiers, high identifiers are more likely to be angry that their group is being treated poorly and will consider collective action to reduce group-based discrimination (Branscombe and Ellemers, 1998) . Interestingly, the role of identification on emotion has seldom been explicitly addressed in terms of moderation as we did in our own work (Tropp and Wright, 1999) . Much should be gained by doing so in future research.
From the point of view of our model, the focus of relative deprivation theory is rather narrow. That is, relative deprivation theory would seem to be relevant in a somewhat more limited number of settings than our more general model of group-based emotions. To take but one example, the fact that the achievements of the ingroup dictate people's positive emotional reactions (Boen, Vanbeselaere, and Feys, 2002; Cialdini, Borden, Thorne, Walker, Freeman, and Sloan, 1976) would not fall under the umbrella of relative deprivation (in fact, most scholars would spontaneously categorize this work under the 'BIRG' label) but they do illustrate our model of group-based emotions as surely as cases where feelings of anger or resentment presumably dominate. In other words, many groupbased emotions other than anger or resentment, on which relative deprivation research has mainly focussed, are also important. We think that our work provides evidence for this and can therefore be used to provide a more differentiated explanation of intergroup behavior. Finally, our model of group-based emotion differs somewhat from closely-related perspectives on social emotions (Smith, 1993) and from earlier contributions inspired by relative deprivation theory in its conception of the target of the emotional experience. For the vast majority of relative deprivation theorists, the focus is on the appraisal of the group's position in society. For Smith (1993 Smith ( , 1999 , the outgroup is the prime emotional target (Mackie, Devos, and Smith, 2000) . Our model, and indeed our empirical studies, suggest that group-based emotions can be experienced on a more general basis. As far as we are concerned, any group-relevant event may trigger emotional experiences. This allows for the intuitively appealing possibility that emotions emerge on a social basis even for ingroup-related events. We thus strongly recommend that not only emotions towards the outgroup be considered as a valid group-based emotion.
Conclusion
We started this chapter by presenting Smith's (1993) theory of intergroup emotions. Criticizing traditional perspectives on prejudice in the intergroup relations literature, Smith (1993) argued that emotional reactions in the social sphere go beyond a simple opposition between positive and negative affect and insisted that they are in fact multifaceted and cover a rich range of reactions. Borrowing from cognitive appraisal theories, Smith proposed that a series of dimensions organize people's subjective assessments of their social environment, which then feed into emotional experiences and guide behaviors. He also relied on the self-categorization theory and recent empirical evidence to propose that the way people see themselves may depend in very significant ways on the groups that they are associated with. In a similar vein, he then suggested that emotions, rather than being strictly individual experiences, can very much be shaped by people's group membership. Smith (1999) noted that in this regard, his theory had much in common with earlier efforts conducted under the banner of relative deprivation theory (Smith and Ho, 2002) . Along with his colleagues, Smith also collected encouraging evidence showing the impact of appraisals on the emergence of intergroup emotions (Mackie, Devos, and Smith, 2000) .
Our own contribution in this domain has been to suggest that appraisals as a determinant of emotional reaction and behavioral tendencies is only one side of the intergroup emotions coin. Another crucial aspect of group-based emotions is the particular social identity that is at work in the context. Indeed, we argued that the specific categorization that is operating in people's minds does more than organize their social landscape. It also commands their interpretation of the events they are confronted with, thereby triggering specific emotions along with the associated behavioral tendencies. In fact, because social comparison is such a central aspect of people's endeavor to understand their surrounding world, our investigations led us to use social comparison as a most efficient tool in order to shape people's emotional reactions in predictable ways.
Over an impressive number of studies, based on very different events, using participants from different countries, investigating different emotions, manipulating either explicitly, or more subtly, the way people categorize themselves, we were able to provide evidence for the validity of our model of group-based emotions. It is obvious that our specific take on the issue of group-based emotions has a lot in common with the research on relative deprivation. In fact, relative deprivation work is uniquely important to our own research in that it clearly demonstrates the implications of social comparison. The originality of our work is that we have taken the theoretical propositions of self-categorization theory regarding the flexibility of social identity and people's sensitivity to contextual forces perhaps more seriously than ever before and shown how the same people may approach things in dramatically different ways as a function of how they categorize themselves.
Clearly, the data we have accumulated in our research program confirm that the way people define the social landscape exerts a most dramatic impact on their appraisals, emotions, action tendencies, and indeed behaviors. The fact that our social comparison manipulation was successful in so many different settings, and the finding that not only the emotional profile but also its degree of consensus were affected, lend impressive support to the idea that the emotional reactions reported by our participants were group-based and not responses deriving from strictly personal considerations. In view of this, we think that our research on group-based emotions provides persuasive evidence that people can indeed experience emotions on behalf of their social identity (see also, Yzerbyt, in press). The special status afforded to social comparison in our empirical efforts made us keenly aware of the numerous connections between the work on social emotions and the work on relative deprivation. We hope that the present chapter, by promoting the idea of further comparing and contrasting these two lines of research, will foster cross-fertilization.
